Publication:
Detection of Indications of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Breaches By States Importing Fast Reactors with Closed NFC Installations

Дата
2022
Авторы
Gorin, N. V.
Karmanov, A. L.
Pervinenko, V. N.
Vlasov, V. V.
Teplykh, N. A.
Kuchinov, V. P.
Chebeskov, A. N.
Shidlovsky, V. V.
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Издатель
Научные группы
Организационные подразделения
Организационная единица
Институт международных отношений
Цель ИМО и стратегия развития - системная подготовка высококвалифицированных кадров, способных решать нестандартные задачи при реализации международных научно-технологических и торгово-промышленных проектов для компаний и корпораций ключевых секторов экономики страны.
Выпуск журнала
Аннотация
The possibility of a state, which has imported a fast reactor with closed fuel cycle enterprises, breaching the nuclear non-proliferation regime and secretly using the acquired equipment, technologies, and nuclear materials to originate nuclear weapons is discussed. It is assumed that the most likely development of events could be an importing state combining clandestine and overt scenarios: clandestine for the preparatory period of development of the non-nuclear components of a nuclear device, accumulation of experience and knowledge, and obtaining the required amount of weapons-grade nuclear material and overt for testing the developed device and its replication. Possible tools for detecting signs of breaching of a nuclear non-proliferation regime when IAEA safeguards are used in an importing state using information technologies are considered. © 2022, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
Описание
Ключевые слова
Цитирование
Detection of Indications of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Breaches By States Importing Fast Reactors with Closed NFC Installations / Gorin, N.V. [et al.] // Atomic Energy. - 2022. - 131. - № 4. - P. 229-233. - 10.1007/s10512-022-00864-6
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