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Proliferation resistance analysis of LWR fuel in terms of IAEA safeguards implementation

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dc.contributor.authorNevinitsa, V.
dc.contributor.authorGusev, V.
dc.contributor.authorSmirnov, A.
dc.contributor.authorVolkov, Y.
dc.contributor.authorГусев, Владислав Евгеньевич
dc.contributor.authorСмирнов, Андрей Юрьевич
dc.contributor.authorВолков, Юрий Николаевич
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-21T08:06:44Z
dc.date.available2024-11-21T08:06:44Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.description.abstract© 2019 Author(s). Nuclear power industry could be truly sustainable only under the condition of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Thus, the issue of nuclear materials illicit diversion is crucial. One possible way to increase the resistance of the nuclear system to proliferation could be the increase of inherent security of nuclear materials used. One of the practical steps here could be the creation of intrinsic barriers in low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel that is used in light water reactors worldwide. By the way, not only natural uranium could be used as raw material for such LEU, but also reprocessed uranium produced from spent nuclear fuel. In this study, proliferation resistance of enriched reprocessed uranium (in other words, commercial LEU made of reprocessed uranium) in the case of its covert diversion was analyzed. The conditions, under which this material could be turned into a direct use material in terms of IAEA was outlined. The scale of enrichment facility required to produce a significant quantity (SQ) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) throughout the duration of three months to two years, having the predetermined amount of diverted material (one SQ of LEU stolen from fresh fuel) was also assessed. Then, it was shown that such a feature of fuel made of reprocessed uranium as 232 U presence makes the detection of potential diversion possible even for much smaller quantities of LEU than in the case of fuel made of natural uranium.
dc.identifier.citationProliferation resistance analysis of LWR fuel in terms of IAEA safeguards implementation / Nevinitsa, V. [et al.] // AIP Conference Proceedings. - 2019. - 2101. - 10.1063/1.5099599
dc.identifier.doi10.1063/1.5099599
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.doi.org/10.1063/1.5099599
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85064880239&origin=resultslist
dc.identifier.urihttp://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=WOS_CPL&DestLinkType=FullRecord&UT=WOS:000473389900007
dc.identifier.urihttps://openrepository.mephi.ru/handle/123456789/17857
dc.relation.ispartofAIP Conference Proceedings
dc.titleProliferation resistance analysis of LWR fuel in terms of IAEA safeguards implementation
dc.typeConference Paper
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.volume2101
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